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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

DR. MARYE. MAIDAand
DR. DAVID L. FELTON,
Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
2020CV333907

v.
RXMM HEALTHLTD. and
CLERISY CORPORATION,

Business Case Div. 4

Defendants.

RXMM HEALTHLTD. and
CLERISY CORPORATION,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

v.
DR. MARYE. MAIDA,
Counterclaim Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CLERISY CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION AND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Clerisy Corporation’s
Motion for Interlocutory Injunction and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings

on

their

Breach-of-Contract

Claim

and

All

of Defendants’

Counterclaims.' Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments and
submissions of counsel on December2, 2020, the Court enters the following order.
1. Background

This dispute concernsthe sale of a businessand its intellectual property for a
nasalstrip that delivers compounds and medicinesto the human body.? (Pls.

MFP,p. 1.)
1.1

Original Sale and Purchase Agreement.

Plaintiff Dr. Mary E. Maida founded Defendant Clerisy Corporation
(“Clerisy”) and served as its CEO. (Compl., | 7.) Plaintiff Dr. David L. Felten was
a shareholder in Clerisy. (Complaint, { 9.) Clerisy’s primary asset wasintellectual
property developed by Dr. Maida.
Under an April 2016 Share Sale and Purchase Agreement (“Sale
Agreement”), Clerisy andits intellectual property (“IP”) were sold to RxMM Health
Pty. Ltd., the predecessor of Defendant RxMM Health Ltd (hereinafter collectively
“RxXxMM”).

(Compl., § 9-11, Ex. B; RxMM Countercl., 7 4, Ex. A.)

The Sale

Agreement obligated RxMMto pay consideration to Drs. Maida and Felten (as well

1,Defndat RxMMHealth Ltd.withdrew its Motion by Special Appearanceto Dismiss

Complaint Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §9-11-12(b)(2) and (b)(5), based on insufficient service of process, that was also
set to be heard on December 2, 2020.

> Asthefirst motion the Court will addressis Plaintiffs’ motion for judgmenton the pleadings, the Court will outline
the facts in the light most favorable to the Defendants, considering the pleadings and the attachmentsto the complaint
and answers. See TMX Finance, LLC v. Goldsmith, 352 Ga. App. 190, 190-191 (2019). Whenthe Court is including
facts that are part of the record butnotpart of the pleadings, it will so note.
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as other shareholders of Clerisy) in the form of money and RxMMshares. (Compl.,

19.)
On November22, 2016, Clerisy entered into a Patent and Know-how License

Agreement with RxMM. (RxMM Countercl., 5, Ex. B.) As described by RxMM,
this agreement provided it with broad authority to “utilize Clerisy’s intellectual
property forall uses of cannabinoids and any active pharmaceutical ingredient that
is or can be combined into the cannabinoid class of compounds.”

(RxMM

Countercl., 4.5.) As part of this agreement, Clerisy also warranted that it would not
grant licenses or other rights in its intellectual property covered by the agreement.
(RxMM Countercl., J 6, Ex. B, § 11.2(f).)
1.2

RxMMFalls Behind in Payments Leading to Forbearance

Agreements

RxMMwastosatisfy its paymentobligations under the Sale Agreement no
later than October 31, 2016. (Compl., Ex. B, § 2.2) However, RxMMstruggled to
makeits payments, andits deal with Plaintiffs evolved overthe next three years. In
December of 2018, both Clerisy and RxMM executed a promissory note for
approximately $900,000 in favor of Plaintiffs (“Initial Note”) and a forbearance
agreement (“Initial Forbearance Agreement”) whereby Plaintiffs would forego their
remedies under the Sale Agreement so long as Defendants made certain scheduled
payments. (Compl., J] 15-16, Ex. A and C.) Plaintiffs received consideration “in
exchange for their continued forbearance from enforcing their legal rights against
3

Clerisy and RxMM. ..” (Compl., 415.) Defendants admit that shortly after entering
into the Initial Note and Initial Forbearance Agreement, they failed to make a
payment due on December 30, 2018, although they claim this default was cured
shortly thereafter. (Compl., { 17; RxMM andClerisy Answers, § 17.)
As calendar year 2019 progressed, the parties do not dispute Clerisy and
RxMM made several small payments owed underthe Initial Note and Initial
Forbearance Agreementalthough Plaintiffs claim the Defendants failed to comply
with the strict terms of the payment schedule. (Compl., § 18; RxMM andClerisy
Answers, { 18.) TheInitial Note was due to mature in June of 2019. (Compl., J 19,
Ex. A, § 1.) In the summer of 2019, Clerisy began seeking opportunities to take the
company public on TSX Venture Exchange, a Canadian stock exchange. (RxMM
Countercl., {| 9; Clerisy Countercl., 7.) Clerisy also began a fundraising campaign
with a $1 million goal. (RxMM Countercl., J 10; Clerisy Countercl., 8.) Plaintiffs
claim throughout July and August of 2019, RxMM andClerisy assured Plaintiffs
they would soon bein a position to fully satisfy their debt, and Plaintiffs agreed to
further forbear in enforcing their remedies. (Compl., 4] 21-22.)
On September 3, 2019, the parties entered into Amended and Restated
Negotiable Promissory Note (“Amended Note”) for approximately $650,000.
(Compl., { 23, Ex. D, § 1; RXxMM Countercl., J 15, Ex. F; Clerisy Countercl., ¥ 13,
Ex. E.) The Amended Note wasto maturea little over one yearlater on September

30, 2020. (Compl, Ex. D, p. 2.) Theparties also entered into the First Amendment
to Forbearance Agreement. (“Amended Forbearance Agreement”) (Compl.,

23,

Ex. E; RxMM Countercl., | 14, Ex. E; Clerisy Countercl., 9 12; Ex. D.)

Additionally, Defendants granted Dr. Maidaa securityinterestin the IP (“IP Security
Agreement”). (RxMM Countercl., J 16, Ex. G; Clerisy Countercl., § 14, Ex. F.)
Again, Plaintiffs received consideration for their agreement to forbear from
enforcing their legal rights against the Defendants. (Compl., 4 23.) Plaintiffs claim
that on September 10, 2019, one weekafter it became effective, Clerisy and RxMM
failed to make the first payment due under the Amended Forbearance Agreement.
(Compl., ¥ 25, Ex. E, § 2(c).)

Around this same time, in September of 2019, Clerisy began merger
discussions with Global Investments Capital Corporation (“Global”) which
culminated in a letter of intent, dated October 3, 2019. (RxMM Countercl., q 12;

Clerisy Countercl., ] 10.) The potential merger was dependent upontheIP that was
the subject of the Sale Agreement and covered by the subsequent IP Security
Agreement Defendants gave Dr. Maida along with additional patent applications
Clerisy submitted after the 2016 sale. (RxMM Countercl., 4] 13; Clerisy Countercl.,

q 11.)
1.3

Defendants Default and Clerisy Assignsits IP Rights to Dr.
Maida under Threat of Litigation

Defendants admit they failed to make a $225,000 payment due under the
Amended Forbearance Agreement on October 31, 2019. (RxMM Countercl., { 2021, Ex. E § 2(c); Clerisy Countercl., Jf 18-19, Ex. D, § 2(c).) On November1, 2019,

Plaintiffs, acting through counsel, sent a demandletter expressly referencing a thirtyday cure provision contained within § 6.3 of the Amended Note, threatening they
would pursue their remedies if the $225,000 payment and an additional $1,500 in
interest and attorney’s fees was not received before November30, 2019 (“Notice of
Default”). (RxMM Countercl., ff] 21-23, Ex. H; Clerisy Countercl, {J 19-20, Ex.
G.) November30, 2019 was a Saturday. Section 5.3 of the Amended Note provided
any paymentfalling due on a weekend, would be due on the next business day.
(Compl., Ex. D, § 5.3.) Accordingly, Defendants took the position the 30-day cure
window established in the Plaintiffs’ Notice of Default ended on the Monday,
December 2, 2019. (RxMM Countercl., n. 3; Clerisy Countercl., n. 2.)

Hours after emailing Defendants with the Notice of Default, Plaintiffs’
counsel sent them a separate and different demand via e-mail. (RxMM Countercl.,
4/27; Clerisy Countercl., 25.) This second demand and the email communications
that followed form the main disputesin this litigation. While the Notice of Default,
expressly relying on § 6.3 of the Amended Note,set forth a 30-day cure period,in
the subsequent demand email Plaintiff's counsel madethreats to act at once against

Defendants. The email stated Plaintiffs would not enter any further forbearance

agreements and would “immediately” file a lawsuit against Defendants, their
principals andrelatedentities, lodging claims of breach ofcontract and fraudrelating
to the Sale Agreement and the subsequent forbearance agreements.
Countercl., 27, Ex. I; Clerisy Countercl., 4 25, Ex. H.)

(RxMM

To avoid an immediate

lawsuit, Plaintiffs’ counsel made the following offer to Defendants.
Ourclients are willing to consider not immediately proceeding with litigation
on one condition — that RxMM and Clerisy execute the assignment of
intellectual property rights attached to this email. Given RxMM’s and
Clerisy’s prior andlatest defaults, there should be no dispute that Dr. Maida
is entitled to the patent rights pursuantto the Intellectual Property Security
Agreement dated September3, 2019. We therefore demand that RxMM and
Clerisy execute the assignment as a condition to any further discussion
regarding forbearance on the monetary sum owedourclients.
(Id.) The email set a November5, 2019 deadline for Clerisy to provide Plaintiff's
counsel with the executed assignment (“IP Assignment”). (Id.)
Defendants were not represented by counsel during these communications.
(RxMM Countercl., p. 13; Clerisy Countercl., p. 13.) Geza Molnar, Clerisy’s Chief
Financial Officer, respondedto Plaintiffs’ counsel that the IP was Clerisy’s primary
asset and “wascritical to the merger” andother efforts to raise capital that would
ultimately enable Clerisy to fulfill its payment obligations. (RxMM Countercl., {
28, Ex. J; Clerisy Countercl., { 26, Ex. I.) He asked the requested IP Assignment
become effective on November 30, 2019. (Id.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel rejected the

request and warned they would not waiver from their November 5, 2019 deadline

for the executed IP Assignment. (RxMM Countercl., J 29, Ex. K; Clerisy Countercl.,

4 27, Ex. J.)
Clerisy replied,
[w]e accept and will comply with youroffer to sign the Assignment of the
Intellectual Property Rights [by the November5, 2019 deadline].
However, we respectfully request a license for Clerisy to use the Intellectual
Property during the period ofthe Forbearance Agreementsubjectto satisfying
all of the requirements of the Forbearance Agreement during the periodit is
in effect. Such license will enable Clerisy to complete its merger with [Global
Investments], its ongoing capital raise, and the timely funding of the
[payments owedto Plaintiffs].
(RxMM Countercl., 4 30, Ex. L; Clerisy Countercl., | 28, Ex. K.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel responded,
[c]ontingent upon execution of the assignmentofintellectual property rights,
our clients are willing to grant Clerisy a non-exclusive license for Clerisy to
use the intellectual property. Ouroffer to license theintellectual property is
also contingent upon Clerisy paying, upfront, our clients’ reasonable
attorney’s fees associated with drafting and negotiating the licensing
agreementand the assignmentofintellectual property rights. . . .
If you acceptthis offer, we will calculate our clients’ actual and anticipated
fees and providethat figure to you.
(RxMM Countercl., 31, Ex. M; Clerisy Countercl., 29, Ex. L.) On November4,

2019, Clerisy executed the IP Assignment and providedit to Plaintiffs’ counsel.
(RxMM Countercl., 4 32, Ex. N; Clerisy Countercl., 4 30, Ex. M.) Dr. Maida and
Clerisy were the parties to the IP Assignment, but it was also signed by RxMM in

its role as Clerisy’s parent company. (RxMM Countercl., Ex. N; Clerisy Countercl.,
Ex. M.)

1.4

Dr. Maida Fails to Provide Clerisy with a License

On November 13, 2019, after exchanging communications regarding the
license, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed Clerisy that Dr. Maida wasno longerwilling to
grant Clerisy a non-exclusive license. Its email announcing Dr. Maida’s change of
heart, provided little explanation:
[w]ith respect to the potential licensing agreement, wepreviously stated that
Dr. Maidais willing to consider granting Clerisy a non-exclusive license to
the intellectual property based upon several conditions. However, upon
further consideration, Dr. Maida has concerns aboutgranting such a license
to Clerisy or RxMM. Accordingly, any outstanding offer by Dr. Maida to do
so is withdrawn.
(RxMM Countercl., {| 33, Ex. O: Clerisy Countercl.,

31, Ex. N.) Dr. Maida’s

counsel further cautioned Clerisy not to make any inaccurate representations
regarding Clerisy’s ownership of the IP subject to the IP Assignment. (Id.) Dr.
Maidaoffered no specific reason for her change of mindin her counsel’s November
13, 2019 email, but, as part of her answer to the Defendants’ counterclaims, she

asserts she decidednotto license the IP upon discovering Defendants had been sued
for fraud by a group of investors and because the Defendants failed to meet her
request for basic financial information. (Maida Answers to RxMM and Clerisy
Countercls., p. 5; Ex. 1 — 6.) Matters escalated and, a couple of days later, Dr.

Maida’s counselsent Clerisy a cease anddesist letter demandingthatit stop making
¥

any claim to ownership ofthe intellectual property. (RxMM Countercl.,

34, Ex.

P; Clerisy Countercl., § 32, Ex. O.)

Dr. Maida’s counsel indicated she was open to additional talks about the
possibility of granting Clerisy a license to the IP, if Clerisy would cure its recent
default. On November 27, 2019, Dr. Maida’s counsel informed Defendants, “Twle

await payment from RxMMandClerisy on or by Monday December2. Wewill not
entertain any further discussions with RxMM andClerisy regarding licensing of the
IP until a substantial payment is made.” (RxMM Countercl., J 39, Ex. Q; Clerisy
Countercl., {| 36; Ex. P.)

On December 2, 2019, Clerisy and RxMM made a

$225,000 payment to Plaintiffs, plus $1,500 in attorney’s fees, the full amount
requested in the November 1, 2019 Notice of Default.

(RxMM Countercl., § 40;

Clerisy Countercl., § 37.) They claim this payment prevented the event of default
that was the subject of the Notice of Default. (Id.) Dr. Maida continuedto refuse to
provide the IP license. (RxMM Countercl., § 41; Clerisy Countercl., ] 38.)
Defendants contend uncertainty regarding the promised license rendered
Clerisy unable to consummate its merger with Global. (RxMM Countercl., § 42;
Clerisy Countercl., 4 39.) As a result, Clerisy and RxMMclaim they were unable to
make the payment due on December 31, 2019 under the Amended Note which
failure they squarely blame on Dr. Maida’s refusal to provide the IP license. (RxMM
Countercl., {| 43; Clerisy Countercl., 4 40.) This financial default prompted another
10

notice from Dr. Maida’s counsel which, again, referenced § 6.3 of the Amended

Note as providing Defendants thirty days to cure the default. (RxMM Countercl.,
44, Ex. R; Clerisy Countercl., 441, Ex. Q.) It is undisputed that the parties continued
to discuss a potential licensing arrangement throughout January and February of
2020 although they never reached an agreement.

(Maida Answer to RxMM

Countercl., 45; Maida Answerto Clerisy Countercl., § 42.)
While notpart of the formal pleadings, evidence opposing Clerisy’s request
for an interlocutory injunction, indicates Clerisy retained counsel who learned Dr.
Maidawasactively attemptingto sell the IP to third parties in late January or early
February of 2020. (Lyndon-James Aff., | 27; Watts Aff., 4 3, Ex. 1, p. 3.)' In late
April of 2020, Clerisy’s counsel tried but was unable to determinethe status of Dr.
Maida’s efforts to sell the IP with Dr. Maida’s counsel. (Watts Aff., J] 4-6.)
2. Procedural Posture

2.1

Drs. Maida and Felten Commencethis Action

Plaintiffs filed the above lawsuit on March 3, 2020 asserting two claims,

breach of contract and attorney’s fees. They claim damagesin excess of $650,000.
(Compl., 27.) Again, evidence offered in opposition to Clerisy’s request for
injunctive relief reflects Dr. Maida begandiscussionsto give an unrelatedthird party

> The Affidavits of Ross Lyndon-James and Meredith Watts are attached as Ex. A and Ex. B. to Clerisy
Corporation’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion forInterlocutory Injunction,filed September 23, 2020.
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a license to the IP aroundthetime shefiled this Complaint in March of 2020. (Maida
Aff., §.7.)* On April 8, 2020, shortly after being served with the lawsuit, Clerisy
attempted to rescind the IP Assignment which Plaintiffs immediately rejected.
(RxMM Countercl., {{{] 47-48, Ex. T; Clerisy Countercl., 9§] 44-45, Ex. S.)

On April 13, 2020, Defendants filed their respective responsive pleadings
which they amended on November 16, 2020.° Both Defendants asserted a variety
of affirmative defenses against Plaintiffs’ complaint, including but not limited to
waiver, estoppel, set-off, accord and satisfaction, lack of damages, impossibility of
performance, and failure of consideration.

(RxMM Answer, pp. 2-3; Clerisy

Answer, pp. 2-3.) Defendants also filed a host of counterclaims directed at Dr.
Maida, accusing her of fraud and other misconduct in order to induce Clerisy to
execute the IP Assignment.

Specifically, Clerisy lodged the following

counterclaims: (CountI) - TRO / Interlocutory Injunction (based upon information
and belief that Dr. Maida has been “shopping around” theintellectual property at
issue);

(Count II) — Rescission (of IP Assignment);

(Count II) - Declaratory

Judgment(regarding validity of the IP AssignmentandClerisy’s rescission attempt);
(Count IV) - Breach of Contract (to provide non-exclusive license); (Count V) Specific Performance (of agreement to provide Clerisy a non-exclusivelicense);

‘ The Affidavit of Dr. Mary E. Maidais attached to her Response in Opposition to Defendant Clerisy Corporation’s
Motion for Interlocutory Injunction, filed October 23, 2020.
> Verifications to these amended pleadings werefiled on November20, 2020.
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(Count VI) - Fraudulent Inducement(to obtain the IP Assignment); (Count VII) Negligent Misrepresentation (to obtain IP Assignment); (Count VIII) - Tortious
Interference with Business Relations (concerning Clerisy’s relationship with
Global); (Count IX) - Unjust Enrichment; (Count X)- Promissory Estoppel; (Count
XI) - Punitive Damages, and (XII) - Attorney’s Fees and Expenses of Litigation
(0.C.G.A. § 13-6-11). The counterclaims asserted against Dr. Maida by RxMM
largely mirrorthose filed by Clerisy; however, the two pleadings do divergeslightly.
RxMM has an additional counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment regarding the
interplay of the Patent and Know-how License Agreement with the IP Assignment,
and it does not lodge breach of contract, specific performance ortortious interference

claims against Dr. Maida. °
Clerisy seeksto have the Court declare the IP Assignment “invalid based upon
the fraudulent inducementorlack of consideration or, in the alternative, require that

Dr. Maida providethe license to Clerisy that she promised. In the alternative, [both
Defendants seek] monetary damages . . . suffered at the hands of Dr. Maida’s

© RxMM’s counterclaims against Dr. Maidaare as follows: (Count1) - TRO Interlocutory Injunction (based upon
information andbelief that Dr. Maida has been “shopping around” the intellectual property at issue);(Count II) —
Rescission (of IP Assignment); (Count III) - Declaratory Judgment(regarding validity of the IP Assignment and
Clerisy’s rescission attempt); (Count IV) - Declaratory Judgment(relating to Patent and Know-how License
Agreement; (Count V) - Fraudulent Inducement (to obtain the IP Assignment); (Count VI) - Negligent
Misrepresentation (to obtain the IP Assignment); (Count VII) - Unjust Enrichment; (Count VIII) - Promissory
Estoppel; (Count IX) -Punitive Damages, and (Count X) - Attorney’s Fees and Expenses of Litigation (O.C.G.A. §

13-6-11).
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conduct.”

(RxMM and Clerisy Countercls., pp. 13-14.)

Because of its large

ownership interest in Clerisy and the valuationofits stock at the time ofthe failed
merger, RxMM hasestimated its damages against Dr. Maida could exceed $12.5
million. (RxMM Countercl., ¥ 38.)
2.2

Pending Motions

On September 23, 2020, Clerisy filed a Motion foran Interlocutory Injunction
seeking to enjoin Dr. Maida from transferring or encumbering the intellectual
property while this suit remained pending.

In an affidavit that is not part of the

pleadings, Dr. Maida avers sometime that same month, September 2020, she

“reached an agreementin principle with an unrelated third party” regarding the
license with a final agreement being struck in October of 2020. (Maida Aff., { 8.)
Dr. Maida has not provided a copy of this purported agreement. She avers these
discussions with the unrelated third party began back in March of 2020, the same
month shefiled this lawsuit. (Id., 7.) Under the termsof this purported agreement
reflecting an intent to license, Maida claimsthe third party will have four monthsto
raise funds, and,if successful, they will “immediately” and “automatically” receive
“an exclusive worldwide license” forthe IP. (Id. at §§ 9-10.) On October 16, 2020,
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on their Breach-of-Contract
Claim andall of Defendants’ Counterclaims.
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While the Court is considering these two motions contemporaneously, it
recognizes they each have entirely different standards of review. While it was the
last motion to be filed, the motion for judgmenton the pleadings will be considered
first so that that the Court may focus solely on the pleadings and not evidence that
has beenput in the record concerningthe requested injunctiverelief.
3. Analysis

3.1

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on their
Breach-of-Contract Claim andall of Defendants’ Counterclaims

3.1.1 Standard ofReview
The same standard of review applies to a motion for judgment on the
pleadings as a motion to dismissforfailure to state a claim under O.C.G.A. § 9-1112(b)(6). A motion for judgment onthe pleadings,
should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose
with certainty that the claimant would notbeentitled to relief underanystate
of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movantestablishes
that the claimant could not possibly introduce affidavits, depositions, or
interrogatories in support of their motion.
TMX Finance, LLC. v. Goldsmith, 352 Ga. App. 190 (2019). In addressing such a
motion,the trial court may consider any exhibits attached to and incorporatedinto
the complaint and answers. Id. at 191.
3.2.2 Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claim

Several of the agreements at issue are not in dispute — the Sale Agreement,
Initial Note, Initial Forbearance Agreement, Amended Note, Amended Forbearance
15

Agreement and IP Security Agreement. Further, Defendants do not dispute their
failure to make the December 2019 payment owed under the Amended Note.
(RxMM andClerisy Answers, § 26.) While significant, Plaintiffs ask the Court to
considerthis default in a vacuum without reference to the other allegations in the
pleadings regarding the IP Assignment and whatled to its execution.
Plaintiffs address only one of Defendants’ affirmative defenses, impossibility,
by arguing,“financial inability does not excuse contract performance as impossible.”
Elavon, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 841 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1306 (2011).
(MFJP, p. 11.)

In response, Defendants contend Plaintiffs misconstrue their

impossibility defense which is based on O.C.G.A. §13-4-23. It provides, “[i]f the
nonperformance of a party to a contract is caused by the conduct of the opposite
party, such conduct shall excuse the other party from performance.”

Defendants

claim that Dr. Maida’s misconduct in securing the IP Assignment thwarted their
merger efforts and renderedit impossible for them to make the December 31, 2019
payment. This argumentis unaddressed by Plaintiffs.
Further, Plaintiffs make no effort whatsoever to rebut numerous other

affirmative defenses Defendants have raised stemming from the IP Assignment,
including but not limitedto set-off, accord andsatisfaction, and lack of damages. In

Hurston v. Dealer Serv. Plan, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 148 (1977), the dispute, like this
one, concerned a note admittedly executed by the defendant. Thetrial court granted
16

summary judgment which wasreversed on appeal. The appellate court found the
motion, whether considered as a motion for summary judgment or a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, could not properly be granted because the defendant
could possibly present evidence supporting his affirmative defenses. The Court
finds the same situation here such that a judgment may not be properly entered on
the pleadings.
3.2.3 Fraudulent Inducement Counterclaims
To prevail on their fraud counterclaims, Defendants must establish five
essential elements: “(1) that the defendant madethe representations; (2) that at the
time he knew they were false; (3) that he made them intending to deceive the

plaintiff; (4) that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representations; and (5) that
the plaintiff sustained the alleged loss and damageas the proximate result oftheir
having been made. McCalla Raymer, LLC y. Foxfire Acres, Inc., 356 Ga. App. 117,
212 (2020).

Asfor the final fraud element concerning damages, Defendants have

sufficiently pled that Dr. Maida’s conduct caused them damages. (RxMM
Countercl., | 86; Clerisy Countercl., § 88.) Consequently, the parties focus their
arguments on the other elements offraud.
Defendants specify four different representations that it considers to be
fraudulent. They are found in the pivotal email exchange between Dr. Maida’s
counselandClerisy after the missed October31, 2019 payment. (RxMM Countercl.,

4 83; Clerisy Countercl., ] 85; Clerisy Mot. for Interloc. Inj., p. 21.) The third and
fourth alleged fraudulent misrepresentationsform the heart of Clerisy’s fraud claim.’
The third alleged fraudulent statement, found in the November 1, 2019 email,
indicated Dr. Maida waswilling to discuss an additional forbearanceif the Clerisy
agreed to the IP Assignment. (Mot. forInterloc. Inj., p. 23.) The fourth alleged
fraudulent statement was found in a November4, 2019 email where Dr. Maida’s

counsel indicated she would grant a non-exclusivelicenseto the intellectual property
in exchangefor the IP Assignment. (Id. at pp. 23-24.) Defendants’ claim both of
these statements were false and intended to deceive Clerisy.
As a generalrule, fraud cannot rest on some promise to perform in the future.

However, an exception to this rule exists where a promiseasto future events
is made with a present intent not to perform or where the promisor knowsthat
the future eventwill not take place. Fraudulentintentat the time of contracting
can be inferred based on subsequent conductof the defendantthat is unusual,
7 Defendants allege the first misrepresentation occurred in a November 1, 2019 email when Dr. Maida’s counsel
threatened she was goingto immediately “proceed withfiling a lawsuit against RxMM, Clerisy, and any andall related
entities . .. and RxMM’s and Clerisy’s principals” asserting claims for breachof contract and fraud unless Defendants
would execute the IP Assignment. (Mot. for Interloc. Injunction, pp. 20-21.) Clerisy claims the statementis false
becauseit had a thirty-day windowto cure its missed October 31, 2019 paymentsuchthat Dr. Maida “had no right to
sue Defendants for breach of contractor fraud” at the time her lawyers lodgedthis litigation threat. (Id., pp. 21-22.)
The secondalleged fraudulent misrepresentationis the statement of Dr. Maida’s attorney, “there should be no dispute
that Dr. Maidais entitled to the pursuantto the Intellectual Property Security Agreement, dated September3, 2019.”
This statementis also found in the November 1, 2019 demand email. (Mot. for Interloc. Injunction, pp. 21-22.) As
these statements concernlegal contentions and opinions, Defendants will be hard-pressed to demonstrate they were
fraudulent.

The general rule is well settled that fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations of law or
misrepresentations as to matters of law. Everyone is presumed to knowthe law andtherefore cannotin legal
contemplation be deceived by erroneous statements of law, and such representations are ordinarily regarded
as mere expressions of opinion,andthis is especially so where there is no confidentialrelationship between
the parties.
Coldwell BankerResidential Real Estate Serv. of GA,Inc. v. Leonard, 176 Ga. App. 130, 131, (1985).
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suspicious, or inconsistent with what would be expected from a contracting
party who had been acting in goodfaith.
Sure, Inc. v. Premier Petroleum, Inc., 343 Ga. App. 219, 229 (2017). Dr. Maida

repudiated her agreementto provide Clerisy with a license to use the IP only nine
days after indicating a license would be granted. In her answer to the Defendants’
counterclaims, Dr. Maida asserts she refused to grant the license because she became
aware of a lawsuit making claims of investor fraud against “several RxMM-related
companies and Clerisy’s and RxMM’s officer and directors . . .” (Maida Ans. to
Clerisy Countercl., p. 5.)

She further claimed Defendants repeatedly failed to

provideher with requested financial information. (Id.) However,these justifications
were not included in the November 13, 2019 email where she withdrew her offer of
a license. (RxMM Countercl., Ex. O; Clerisy Countercl, Ex. N.)

At the time she

made the offer of a license, she had been dealing with slow pay/no pay problems
involving Clerisy and RxMM for almost three and one-half years; however, she
claims that she only developedthese reservations about further dealings with these
two entities during this nine-day window.
“Fraud

may

be

proved

by

slight

circumstances,

and

whether

a

misrepresentationis fraudulent and intendedto deceiveis generally a jury question.”
JTH Tax, Inc. v. Flowers, 302 Ga. App. 719, 726 (2010). Construing the pleadings
in the light most favorable to Defendants, circumstantial evidence suggests Dr.
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Maida could have promised Clerisy a license in order to trick or entice the
Defendants to quickly execute the IP Assignment. Such a maneuver would have
allowed Dr. Maida to quickly obtain herrights to the IP and avoid pursuing her
contractual remedies under the Amended Note and Amended Forbearance
Agreement which could have been more onerous, time-consuming, and expensive.
Forthese reasons, the Court finds judgment based solely on the pleadingsis
not warranted for Defendants’ fraud counterclaims.
3.2.4 Negligent Misrepresentation Counterclaims
Fraud and negligent misrepresentation are governed by the sameprinciples,
so the analysis outlined above regarding the fraudulent inducement counterclaim
would apply to the Defendants’ negligent misrepresentation counterclaims.
Anderson v Atlanta Comm.for Olympic Games, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 895, 900 (2003);

see also

Holmes v. Grubman, 286 Ga. 636, 640-641 (2010) (‘the only real

distinction between negligent misrepresentation and fraud is the absence of the
element of knowledgeof the falsity of the information disclosed.”).
Dr. Maidaoffers an additional argument why sheis notbeliable for negligent
misrepresentation, arguing her lawyers, who madethe alleged misrepresentation,
owed no duty to the Defendants. Sherelies primarily on McKenna Long & Aldridge,
LLP v. Keller, 267 Ga. App. 171 (2004), but the Court finds McKenna to be
inapplicable to this situation.
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In McKenna,a law firm,acting on behalf of an employer, sent a demandletter
to a competitor of its client who was discussing job prospects with its client’s
employee.

The demand letter accused the employee of misconduct which the

employee claimed were unfounded, and he sued the law firm for not investigating
the allegations it included in the demandletter.

The appellate court reversed the

trial court’s denial of a motion for judgmenton the pleadings, finding the party to a
legal dispute may notbring an action against the adversary’s attorney for negligence
because the attorney owes no duty to the non-client.
Here, Dr. Maida’s attorneysare not being suedin their own right. Rather, Dr.
Maidais being sued for statements made byherattorney while serving as her agent.
0.C.G.A. § 10-6-56 (“[t]he principal shall be boundby all representations made by
his agent in the business ofhis agency andalsoby his willful concealment ofmaterial
facts, although they are unknownto the principal and knownonly by the agent”);
see also O.C.G.A. § 10-6-60 (“[t]he principal shall be bound . . . for the neglect and
fraud ofhis agentin the transactionof [the principal’s] business.”) Accordingly, Dr.
Maida’s attempt to expand McKennawhich shieldedattorneys from liability to nonclients is not well-founded.
3.2.5 Rescission Counterclaims
In addition to the fraudulent inducement counterclaims, the rescission claim

presents an additional question oftiming because the rightto rescind can be waived
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if the defrauded party unduly delays in exercising it. “Waiver is generally found
wherethe intent to rescind is not asserted in a timely fashion. Theparty asserting
rescission must announcehis intentto do so as soonasthe facts underlying the claim
are known to him.”

Lehmanv. Keller, 297 Ga. App. 371, 373, 374 (2009).

Plaintiffs focussolely on the timing, noting Defendants became aware ofDr.
Maida’s refusal to grant the license on November 13, 2019 and did not seek to
rescind until April 8, 2020, almost five months later. On the timing issue alone, the
Court finds it is unable to determine, based solely on the pleadings, that the
rescission effort was so delayed that it should be deemed ineffective as a matter of
law.
Defendants cite one case whererescission was deemed untimely based solely
on the pleadings, but it was factually distinct from the present matter. In Payne v.

DOCO Fed. Credit Union, 2016 WL 9753973, at *4 (M.D. Ga. July 1, 2016),
plaintiff soughtto rescind seven or eight monthsafter learning of the purported fraud
and only tendered the proceeds he received from the contract he was seeking to
rescind an additional three and one-half monthslater. ®

® Plaintiffs cite several summary judgment cases whererescission efforts were deemed untimely. (MFJP, pp. 2122.) Not only was the procedural posture of the cited cases different, each involved a longer time period between
discovery andthe rescission effort than is present here. Buckley v. Turner Heritage Homes, Inc., 248 Ga. App. 793,
795 (2001)(summary judgment affirmed on untimely rescission attempt that occurred ten months after discovery);
Holloman v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 241 Ga. App. 141, 146 (1999)(summary judgmentaffirmed on untimely rescission
attempt fifteen months after purchasing home with numerous alleged defects); Orion Capital Partners, L.P. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 223 Ga. App. 539 (1996)(summary judgment affirmed on untimely rescission attempt
made seven monthsafter discovery).

22

Moreover, in addition to timing, a court should also consider the

circumstances in determining whether a rescission effort has been timely made. A
defrauded party seeking to rescind, must act with the promptness “which the nature
of the case and environment of the circumstances would require.

What might be

termed as prompt action in one case might in another instance be regarded as
inexcusable laches.” Newton v. Burks, 139 Ga. App. 617, 618 (1976) (punctuation
and citation omitted.) Here, Dr. Maida has admitted she continued discussions about

providing Defendants with a license throughout January and February of 2020. This
lawsuit wasfiled on March 3, 2020, and Clerisy madeits rescission attempt about
one monthlater.
Here, when considered in context -- particularly Dr. Maida’s continued
discussions about providing Defendants with the requested IP license which may
have deterred them from immediately rescinding the IP Assignment -- the Court
cannot determine solely on the pleadings that Clerisy’s rescission attempt was
untimely.
3.2.6 Clerisy’s Tortious Interference with Business Relations
Counterclaim

Clerisy contends Dr. Maida tortiously interfered with its relationship with
Global, its intended merger partner.

To recover for tortious interference with

business relations, Clerisy must demonstrate Dr. Maida: (1) acted improperly and
without privilege; (2) acted purposely and with malice with the intentto injure; (3)
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induced Globalnotto enterinto or continue a business relationship with Clerisy; and
(4) caused Clerisy financial injury.

Cook Pecan Co., Inc. v. McDaniel, 344 Ga.

App. 370, 374 (2018).
Dr. Maidaarguesthis claim is precluded underthe“strangerdoctrine” because
she was not an intermeddler to the business relationship and, thus, she acted with

privilege, leaving Clerisy unable to demonstrate the first element of the
aforementioned test. (MFJP, pp. 23-24.)
To be liable for tortious interference with business relations, one must be a

stranger to the business relationship giving rise to and underpinning the
contract. But where a defendant had a legitimate interest in the contract or a
party to the contract, he is not a strangerto the contractitself or to the business
relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract. Nor does thefact
that a defendant did not sign the contract preclude a finding that he was no
stranger to the contract.

In sum,all parties to an interwoven contractual

arrangement are not liable fortortious interference with any of the contracts
or business relationships.

This particular aspect of the stranger doctrine concerns third party
beneficiaries to contracts. “Those who have a direct economic interest in or would
benefit from a contract with which they are alleged to have interfered (even though
not intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract) are not strangers to the
contract” and havenotortious interferenceliability. Mabra v. SF, Inc., 316 Ga. App.

62, 65 (2012). Here, Clerisy claims Dr. Maida’s interest in the Global merger was
merely ancillary. (Response in Opposition, p. 21.) “Notably ... one does not
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become anunintended third-party beneficiary of a contract simply because he might
receive someincidental benefit from performanceof that agreement.” Howerton v.
Harbin Clinic, LLC, 333 Ga. App. 191, 197 (2015).

The question of whether Dr. Maida wasa strangerto Clerisy’s relationship
with Global necessarily involves questions about Clerisy’s merger with Global and
the benefits that might flow to Dr. Maida therefrom that receive only passing
mention in the Defendants’ counterclaims. Accordingly, the Court finds Clerisy
could offer evidence within the framework ofits counterclaim that would support its
position that Dr. Maida was a stranger to this relationship so that this tortious
interference claim cannotbe resolved onthepleadings.
3.2.7 Clerisy’s Breach of Contract Counterclaim against Dr. Maida
First, Dr. Maida argues Clerisy unconditionally agreed to execute the IP
Assignment in its November 2, 2019 email so that the parties never reached a
contract for her to provide an IP license in exchangefor the IP Assigment. This is a
selective reading of the email and the communications that followed. Clerisy did
agree to execute the IP Assignment requested by Dr. Maida, but immediately
followed, “[h]owever, werespectfully require a license for Clerisy to use the [IP]
during the period of the Forbearance Agreement . . .” (RXxMM Countercl., § 30, Ex.
L; Clerisy Countercl., 28, Ex. K (emphasis supplied.)) In response, Dr. Maida’s

counselstated her willingness to grant a license uponthereceipt of the executed IP
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assignment and Clerisy’s agreement to pay her attorney’s fees. (Id., Ex. M.) Their
email continued,“[i]f you acceptthis offer, we will calculate our clients’ actual and
anticipated fees and provide that figure to you.” (RxMM Countercl., § 31, Ex. M;
Clerisy Countercl., ] 29, Ex. L (emphasis supplied.)) Clerisy executed the requested
IP Assignment the following day.

(RxMM Countercl., § 32, Ex. L; Clerisy

Countercl., 4 30, Ex. M.) Viewedin the light most favorable to Defendants, these
emails suggest Dr. Maida’s own counsel did not view Clerisy as unconditionally
agreeing to execute the IP Assignmentbut rather viewed its statementoutlining its
willingness to execute the requested IP Assignment as part of a continuing
negotiation that led to the alleged contract — where the IP Assignment was
immediately executed in exchange fora license allowing Clerisy to use the IP -- that
Defendants are now seeking to enforce.
Second,Plaintiffs argue that an enforceable contract never arose because the

parties failed to agree upon the materials terms of the non-exclusive license
agreement. They are correct to note, “[a] contract cannot be enforcedifits terms are
incomplete, vague, indefinite or uncertain.” Laymac v. Kushner, 249 Ga. App. 727,

733 (2019). However, “[t]he law does not favor destruction of contracts on grounds
of uncertainty.” Id. Here, the email correspondence detailed above reflects the
parties’ discussions as to whether Dr. Maida would grant Clerisy a non-exclusive
license for the IP that would continue “for the period of the Forbearance Agreement
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subject to satisfying all the requirements of the Forbearance Agreement” in
exchange for Clerisy’s immediate execution of the IP Assignment.
Considering this exchange where the parties discuss terms, duration and
consideration for Clerisy’s license, the Court doesnotfindthe alleged contractis so
indefinite that Clerisy could not offer evidence within the framework of the
pleadings establishing an enforceable contract.
3.2.8 Defendants’ Equitable Counterclaims for Promissory
Estoppel, Unjust Enrichment, and Specific Performance
Defendants have lodged three equitable counterclaims. Defendants allege that
through the IP Assignment, Dr. Maida has been unjustly enriched and conferred a
benefit for which, in good conscience and equity, Clerisy deserves compensation.
(RxMM Countercl., Count VII;

Clerisy Countercl., Count IX.)

Through its

promissory estoppel claim, Defendants allege justice can only be avoided by
enforcing the promise that Clerisy relied upon in executing the IP Assignment.
(RxMM Countercl., Count VIII; Clerisy Countercl., Count X.)

Finally, Clerisy

seeks to compel Dr. Maida’s specific performance of her promise to grant a nonexclusive license for the IP. (Clerisy Countercl., Count V.)
Plaintiffs make only a passing attack of the merits of these counterclaims.?
They primarily argue that Defendants longstanding failure to abide by their

° With regard to Defendants’ promissory estoppel and specific performance counterclaims, Dr. Maida argues the
promise of a license wastoo indefinite to enforce. (MFJP, pp. 28-29.) The Court rejects this argument for the same
reasons detailed above, in discussing the Defendants’ breach of contract counterclaim.
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contractual obligations renders them unworthy of equitable relief, essentially urging
the old adage, “he who asks equity must do equity.” O.C.G.A. § 23-1-10. Plaintiffs
offer no legal authority to support their position that failure to abide by the terms of
a legal contract leaves one ineligible for equitable relief. As a general matter, the
Court does not find application of this precept to be wise in a creditor — debtor
situation where the debtor has defaulted on a payment. To preclude a debtor from
receiving equitable relief merely because of missed payments could provide
creditors with the uncheckedability to overreach.
Specifically, construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to
Defendants, Dr. Maida, with full knowledge of Defendants’ ongoing payment
defaults entered into two successive forbearance agreements and each time received
additional consideration as a result. For these reasons, based solely upon the
pleadings, the Court does not find Defendants’ failure to abide by their contractual
paymentobligations haveleft them ineligible for equitablerelief.
Plaintiffs also argue Defendants are not entitled to equitable relief because
they have adequate remediesat law, particularly money damages. “Equity will only
grant relief where there is no available adequate and complete remedy at law.”
Cantrell v. Henry County, 250 Ga. 822, 824 (1983).

However, Defendants have

asserted their equitable claims in the alternative to their claims for money damages.
(Defs. Brf. in Opp’n., p. 26.) Such alternative claims are permissible under Georgia
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law. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-18(a)(“party asserting a claim to relief as an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may join, either as

independentor as alternate claims, as many claims, legal or equitable, as he has
against an opposingparty.’’)
3.2.9 Defendants’ Declaratory Judgment Claims
Both Defendants seek a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the IP
Assignment.'° Plaintiffs argue this is not the proper subject for declaratory relief as
Clerisy executed the IP Assignment over a year ago, and they face no presentlegal
uncertainty emanating from the IP assignment— which is a key requirement for
declaratory relief. Walker v. Owens, 298 Ga. 516, 519 (2016). Plaintiffs argue these
claimsare “in reality, purely duplicativeoftheirtort, contract, and equitable claims”
which will necessarily resolve this request for a declaratory judgment. (MFJP, p.
30.)
Initially, Defendants sought this declaratory relief on the groundsthat the IP
Assignment was void as it lacked consideration and mutuality of obligation.
(RxMM Countercl., § 69; Clerisy Countercl., ] 66.) However, after this motion was
filed, Defendants amended their pleadings.

They now indicate they also need

10 It should be noted RxMM also seeks a declaratory judgment relating to the Patent and Know-how License
Agreementin the event the IP Assignmentis determined to be valid. (RxMM, Countercl., Count IV.) While Plaintiffs
indicate they seek judgment on the pleadingsas to all Defendants’ counterclaims, they have not offered any specific
argumentasto this declaratory judgmentclaim.
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declaratory relief regardingthe viability of the IP Assignmentin light of Dr. Maida’s
refusal to recognize their efforts to rescind the agreement.
Countercl., 75; Amended Clerisy Countercl., 973.)

(Amended RxMM

In Radio Perry, Inc. v. Cox

Communications, Inc., 323 Ga. App. 604, 611 (2013), the appellate court reversed
the trial court’s dismissal of a claim seeking declaratory judgment on whether the
plaintiff's efforts at rescission were successful.
Defendants also argue that even if the IP Assignment is found valid,
uncertainty exists regarding their future conduct. They assert one of the patent
applications subject to the IP Assignment “currently pending before the United
States Patent and Trademark Office. Prior to executing the [IP Assignment], Clerisy
spearheadedthe prosecutionofthe patent application” andthey are uncertain whois
now responsible for pursuing the patent application. (Defs. Brf. in Opp’n., p. 30.)
The IP Assignmentaddresses patent rights. (Complaint, Ex. N, § (a); Schedules AC.)
The Court finds evidence could be introduced within the framework of the
Defendants’ counterclaims that Defendants face present uncertainty regarding the
legal rights and obligations and need direction regarding ownership ofthe IP.
4. Clerisy’s Motion for Interlocutory Injunction
Through its counterclaims, Clerisy seeks to be deemed the owner of the IP
transferred to Dr. Maida or, alternatively, that Dr. Maida be required to license the
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intellectual property to Clerisy. Clerisy seeks to enjoin Dr. Maida fromtransferring
any rights in the property during the pendencyof thislitigation.
4.1 Preliminary Defenses to the Entry of an Interlocutory Injunction
Dr. Maida has raised two preliminary defenses against the entry of an
interlocutory injunction, mootness and laches.
Dr. Maida claims the October 2020 agreement she reached with an unrelated
third party renders the motion moot.

“Injunctive relief by its nature must be

prospective. Ifthe thing soughtto be enjoinedin fact takes place, the grant or denial
of the injunction becomes moot. A case is moot whenits resolution would amount
to the determination of an abstract question not arising uponexisting fact or rights.”
Crawford v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 343 Ga. App. 47, 48 (2017)(citations and
punctuation omitted.). In Crawford, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
decision thata petition to enjoin a foreclosure sale was mootbecause the foreclosure
had already occurred.

This mootness concept has been applied in a variety of

contexts involving injunctive relief. See Clark v. Deal, 298 Ga. 893 (2016)(efforts
to enjoin newly appointed judges from taking office became mootoncethe judges
were sworn in); Jackson v. Bibb County School Dist., 271 Ga. 18 (1999)(effort to
enjoin school board members from closing on a contract to purchase land was
mooted once the closing occurred); Sweet City Landfill, LLC v. Elbert County, 347
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Ga. App. 311 (2018)(efforts to enjoin an ordinance was rendered moot when the
ordinance was repealed andreplaced).
While Dr. Maida’s mootness argumentis grounded in soundlegaltheory,it is
currently lacking in evidence. It is only supported by some vague averments from
Dr. Maida regarding her recent contract to license the IP. Heraffidavit states: (1)
discussions with an unnamed third party who she described as being “unrelated”
began in March of 2020,(2) an agreementin principal was reached in September of
2020, (3) a formal agreement followed in October of 2020, and (4) under the terms
of the agreement, if the would-be licensee raises an unspecified amountof capital
within four months,it will automatically receive an exclusive, world-wide license.

(Maida Aff., Jf] 7-10.)
The Court findsit is unable to consider the referenced contract under the best
evidence rule.

O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1002 (‘[t]o prove the contents of a writing,

recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph shall be
required.”) Even if the Court were to ignore the evidentiary deficiency regarding
this contract, the lack of specificity in Dr. Maida’s affidavit regarding this contract
renders hertestimony unpersuasive.
Dr. Maida also contends Defendants’ delay in seeking injunctive relief
precludes entry of an interlocutory injunction. In Novemberof 2019, Defendants
becameaware that Dr. Maida had, in their view, defrauded them into executing the
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IP assignment with the promise ofa license that she subsequently refused to grant.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in March of 2020 seeking money owed from
Defendants.

Defendants did not seek any injunctive relief until they filed the

responsive pleadings on April 13, 2013, and this specific motion seeking an

interlocutory injunction wasnot filed until several months later on September 23,
2020.
“Tt is well settled that the extraordinary equitable relief of injunction will be
denied a party where, with full knowledgeofhis rights, he has been guilty of delay
in asserting them, and has allowed large expenditures to be made by another party
on whom great injury would be inflicted by the grant of the injunction.” McGregor
v. Town of Ft. Oglethrope, 236 Ga. 711, 713 (1976)(punctuation and citations
omitted.)

As McGregor indicates, timing is not the only factor for the Court to

consider. It must evaluate the circumstances of the case and consider other factors
such as, “the length of the delay, the sufficiency of the excuse for the delay, the
resulting loss of evidence, and the prejudice suffered. To prevail on a claim oflaches,
a party must prove some harm orprejudice caused by the delay.” Jenkins v. Sallie
Mae, Inc., 286 Ga. App. 502, 505 (2007) (citation omitted.)
While the length of delay works against Clerisy, questions remain as to
whether the delay was harmful.

It appears there has been no loss of evidence

attributable to Clerisy’s delay in seeking injunctive relief.
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Further, evidence of

prejudice suffered by Dr. Maida,like the evidence she offered on the mootnessissue,
is vague.

Accordingly, the Court finds laches should not bar Clerisy’s request for

injunctiverelief.
4.2

Standard for Granting an Interlocutory Injunction

While the motion for injunctive relief raises many of the same issues
addressedin the Plaintiff's motion for judgmenton the pleadings, here the Court can
consider evidence that has been placed in the record and offered during the
December2, 2020 hearing.
“Whether an interlocutory injunction is warranted is a matter committed to
the discretion ofthe trial court.” TMX Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. DrummondFin. Serv.,
LLC, 300 Ga. 835, 836 (2017). In exercising that discretion, a court should balance

the following four factors:
(1) whether there exists a substantial threat that a moving party will suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) whether the threatened
injury to the moving party outweighs the threat and harm that the injunction
may do to the party being enjoined; (3) whether there is a substantial
likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits at trial; and (4)
whether granting the interlocutory injunction will not disserve the public
interest.
Id.

All four of these factors need not be demonstrated in order to secure an

interlocutory injunction; however, “a trial court must keep in mind that an
interlocutory injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the powerto grant it must
be prudently and cautiously exercised.” Id. at 836-837.
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4.3 Analysis

The first two factors for the Court to consider involve the type and balancing
of harmsposed tothe parties by the entry of an injunction. Clerisy argues it would
be irreparably harmed without the injunction because the technology is unique and
the resulting lost business opportunities are not easily remedied by monetary
damages. It also argues that it suffers the risk of greater harm if the request for
injunctive relief were denied than Dr. Maida would face if an injunction were
granted.
While the Court determined laches should not bar Clerisy’s request for
injunctive relief, it does find that Clerisy’s delay in seeking injunctive relief
significantly undermines its arguments regarding the harm it faces in the absence of
such relief. Clerisy’s counsel learned of Dr. Maida’s efforts to sell the IP in January
or February of 2020. (Watts Aff., J 3.) The Court finds if Clerisy felt Dr. Maida’s
sale of the IP threatened it with a harm that was severe or could not be easily
remedied, it would have acted much soonerto seek the Court’s protection.
As concerns the prospects Clerisy will prevail on the merits, many of its
arguments are well-taken, but considering the caution the Court is required to
exercise in entering an injunction, it does not find the likelihood that Clerisy will
prevail on the merits to be so substantial as to merit injunctive relief. TMX Fin.
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As the subject of the injunction is a fledgling medical product with little
market share and uncertain efficacy, the Court does not find the public interest for

or against an injunction wields much weightin its analysis.
In considering these factors, the Court declines to enjoin Dr. Maida from
transferring her rights in the IP during the pendencyofthis litigation.
5. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, itis ORDEREDthatPlaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings on their Breach-of-Contract Claim and All of Defendants’
Counterclaims and Defendant Clerisy Corporation’s Motion for Interlocutory
Injunction are DENIED.
SO ORDEREDthis 30th day of December, 2020.

/s/ John J. Goger
JOHN J. GOGER, SENIOR JUDGE

Fulton County Superior Court
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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